Abstract. The paper attempts to show how the Logical Empiricists' interpretation of the relation between geometry and reality emerges from a collision of mathematical traditions. Considering Riemann's work as the ini-
tiator of a 19th century geometrical tradition, whose main protagonists were Helmholtz and Poincaré, the Logical Empiricists neglected the fact that Riemann's revolutionary insight ourished rather in a non-geometrical tradition dominated by the works of Christoel and Ricci-Curbastro roughly in the same years. I will argue that in the attempt to draw the line Riemann-HelmholtzPoincaré-Einstein Logical Empiricists were led to argue that General Relativity raised mainly a problem of mathematical under-determination, i.e. the discovery that there are physical dierences that cannot be expressed in the relevant mathematical structure of the theory. However, a historical reconstruction of the alternative line of development Riemann-Chritoel-Ricci-Einstein shows on the contrary that the main philosophical issue raised by Einstein's theory was rather that of mathematical over-determination, i.e. the recognition of the presence of redundant mathematical dierences that do not have any correspondence in physical reality.
In Logical Empiricists' philosophy of space and time, Einstein's conception of the relations between geometry and experience appears to be the heir of a 19th century philosophical and scientic tradition, whose main protagonists were Riemann, Helmholtz, and Poincaré. The result of such a tradition appeared to be at best framed in Reichenbach's celebrated theory of equivalent descriptions. Riemann, Helmholtz and Poincaré discovered the principle of the relativity of geometry , i.e. our freedom to chose among dierent metric geometries in as much as they can be transformed into one another by unique and continuous transformations, that is in as much as they are, in the Logical Empiricists' parlance, topologically equivalent.
It is probably the merit of Michael Friedman to have convincingly shown that such a tradition simply never existed (Friedman, 1995 ). Helmholtz's and Poincaré's philosophy of geometry presupposes homogenous spaces, which can be covered by congruent tiles without gaps and overlappings. In such geometries there is a unique set of congruence relations, on which all observer can agree, or, more technically, a group of self-mappings with the properties of rigid motions can be dened. Riemann, on the contrary, left open the possibility of highly non-uniform spaces, where no group of motion can be dened and thus no unique conventional agreement can be made as to which tiles are congruent.
Logical Empiricists were of course aware of the elementary fact that there are no rigid bodies in spaces of variable curvature. However, by stripping Helmholtz and Poincaré philosophy of geometry from their group-theoretical implications (Friedman, 1995) , they believed it was simply possible to shift the attention from nite rigid bodies to innitesimal rigid rods. As Roberto Torretti has shown, however, this strategy is hardly compatible with conventionalism. In a Riemannian manifold, an innitesimal rod is considered rigid as long as it has an Euclidean behavior; one does not set by convention, which rods are rigid, but instead checks it under the hypothesis that the space is Euclidean in its smallest parts (Torretti, 1983) .
In Riemannian geometry adopted in General Relativity, once a unit of measure as been arbitrarily xed, the length of an the innitesimal measure rod turns out to possess an absolute value, so that two intervals at a nite distance can be immediately compared. Einstein, it is true, refers, rather sporadically, to Helmholtz and Poincaré in his writing on the philosophy of geometry (Friedman, 2002) . However, Einstein's reference should be rather understood in the context of the so called measuring rod objection against Hermann Weyl's attempt at unifying electricity and gravitation by dropping the length comparison at-distance, rather then as a defense of conventionalism (Fogel, 2008, ch. 5) .
Thus it has been abundantly shown that the Logical Empiricists' attempt to read Einstein's general theory as the heir of a geometrical tradition that starting with Riemann was developed into the epistemological works of Helmholtz and Poincaré was substantially awed. In my opinion, however, an even more simple historical point has escaped recent historical literature. It is even more signicant that the Logical Empiricists were not able to philosophically appreciate the fact that Riemann's work, roughly in the same years, was mainly developed in a nongeometrical tradition in the work of authors such as Elwin Bruno Christoel and Gregorio Ricci-Curbastro, the father of the so called absolute dierential calcu-
lus (our tensor calculus). Of course Einstein himself explicitly considered General
Relativity precisely as the heir of this tradition, or, as he famously put it, a real triumph of the method of the general dierential calculus.
Riemann's work, considered from the point of view of Helmholtz's and Poincaré's philosophical reections on geometry, appeared to the Logical Empiricist as concerned with the question of the choice among alternative physical geometries. Interpreted under the light of Christoel's and Ricci-Curbastro's work, Riemann's main concern appears to be that of discerning the objective geometrical properties of the same physical geometry those that are independent of the particular coordinate system we choose from those properties that are a mere artifact of the coordinate system used.
As far I can see, the names of Christoel and Ricci are not even mentioned by the Logical Empiricists. I would like to venture that this at least partially may have to do with the fact, that they never intervene in the philosophical debate on the foundation of geometry. In order to show that some quantity has geometrical substance and is not just an artifact of some arbitrary choice of coordinates, they merely invoked the abstract study of the law of transformation of the quadratic dierential forms. However, it is only from this point of view that the mathematical apparatus of Riemannian geometry and most of all its role in General Relativity in the form of the requirement of general covariance can be understood.
The aim of this paper is to show that the inadequacy (Friedman, 1983; Nerlich, 1994; Ryckman, 2007 Ryckman, , 2008 of the Logical Empiricists' interpretation of General Relativity is in many respects the consequence of their failure to recognize the philosophical signicance of this mathematical tradition. Logical Empiricists tried to interpret the role of Riemannian geometry in Einstein's General Relativity through the lenses of the epistemological problems raised by Helmholtz and Poincaré. Historically and systematically however Riemann's revolutionary approach became part of Einstein's theory of gravitation through the mediation of the analytical work of Christoel and Ricci.
After a brief description of how the Riemann's insight was developed analytically (mainly, even if of course not only) by Christoel and later by Ricci in the so called absolute dierential calculus (1) and then implemented in the General Theory of Relativity (2),; the paper concentrates on Reichenbach's famous conversion to conventionalism and on the emergence of the standard logical empiricist interpretation of the relation between geometry and physics (3).
The case of Reichenbach's appears particularly signicant. Reichenbach's insistence on the relativity of coordinates in his rst Kantian monograph (Reichenbach, 1920b ) appears much more eective in hindsight than his later appeal to the relativity of geometry (Reichenbach, 1928 ). Reichenbach's deep knowledge of the mathematical apparatus of General Relativity shows that this change of position was not the consequence of a trivial blunder, but the conscious pursuit of a philosophical program. The philosophical inadequacy of his reading emerges paradoxically by following the more expository/semi-technical parts his work, rather than concentrating on his philosophical interpretation (4).
Recent historically oriented philosophy of science has insisted on the importance of the 19th century debate on the foundation of geometry in order to understand the emergence of Logical Empiricism and, in particular, of its interpretation of the Theory of Relativity (Ryckman, 1992; Coa, 1991; Friedman, 1999; Howard, 1994; Friedman, 2008 , only to mention some titles). However, in my opinion, even recent well-informed and inuential works (see of instance DiSalle, 2006) have not given sucient attention to the implicit philosophical signicance of the development of the Riemann's ideas in the work of Christoel and Ricci. This investigation was therefore left exclusively to the history of mathematics (see for instance the classical Reich, 1994) , rather than being considered a part of that synthetic history (Dickson and Domski, 2010) that eventually led to the emergence of modern philosophy of science.
The lling of this lacuna in the historical literature on Logical Empiricism could help to clarify a more general philosophical misunderstanding, which seems to characterize early philosophical interpretations of General Relativity. General Relativity, considered as the heir to the 19th century conventionalism of Helmholtz and Poincaré, seemed to raise the problem of mathematical under-determination ; it shows the existence of mathematically equivalent, but dierent physical geometries, among which we can only make a pragmatic choice. Considered as the heir to the work of Riemann, Christoel and Ricci, General Relativity appears mainly to raise a problem of mathematical over-determination ; it shows that it is possible to represent the same physical geometry in dierent coordinate systems, using dierent mathematical functions. General Relativity shows the existence of a redundancy in the mathematical description, rather than reducing the mathematical structure which is physically relevant. der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen . This short address will turn out to be one of the most inuential (even if only partially understood) papers in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Riemann famously considered space as a special case of n-dimensioned manifoldness (Riemann 1854 (Riemann /1868 tr. Riemann, 1873; cf. Scholz, 1982) , expressed by means of n variables x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n (Riemann, 1854 (Riemann, /1868 tr. 1873, 15) . Inspired by Gauss's theory of curved surfaces (Gauss, 1827) , Riemann assumed as an hypothesis (as the simplest among other possible alternatives) that space is distinguished from other manifoldnesses by the fact that the so called line element ds, is the square root of an always positive integrable homogeneous function of the second order of the quantities dx, in which the coecients are continuous functions of the quantities x, (Riemann 1854 (Riemann /1868 tr. 1873, 15; cf. Libois, 1957; Scholz, 1992) . As is well known, Riemann's abstract approach turned out to be extremely powerful, allowing an innity of possible geometries. Dierent geometries correspond to dierent expressions for the line element endowed by dierent sets of coecients.
The opposite, however, is not necessarily true. Riemann observed that every such expression can be transformed into another similar one if we substitute for the n independent variables functions of n new independent variables (Riemann 1854 (Riemann /1868 tr. 1873, 16 ), x 1 , . . . x n . The coecients of the quadratic expression will depend on the variable used, but it is possible to show how the coecients transform under a change of the independent variables in such a way as to make ds 2 remain unchanged.
However, as immediately Riemann made clear, we cannot transform any expression into any other (Riemann 1854 (Riemann /1868 tr. 1873, 16) . The fact that a sphere cannot be projected onto a plane without distortion can be expressed analytically by the fact that it is impossible to convert the quadratic dierential form, which holds on a sphere by means of a mere transformation of the independent variables, to one in which the square of the line-element is expressed as the sum of the squares of complete dierentials, that is to one in which the line-element may be reduced to the form dx 2 (Riemann 1854 (Riemann /1868 (Riemann , 141, tr. 1873 ; for more details Portnoy, 1982; Zund, 1983) . Dierent geometries are expressed analytically by dierent line elements, but the dierence in the appearance of the line element does not necessary imply a geometrical dierence. One of the main problems raised by Riemann's inquiry was that of discerning the geometrical properties that do not depend on a particular choice of the independent variables, from those that are a mere deceptive appearance introduced by the mathematical formalism.
Riemann's speech, which was supposed to be held in front of an audience of non-mathematicians, was intentionally scarce in the use of mathematical formulas. However, Riemann's somehow cryptic parlance becomes more familiar to the modern reader, if one considers the notation that he introduced in the so called Commentatio mathematica (Riemann, 1861 /1876 , tr. Farwell, 1990 a paper submitted to the Paris Academy in 1861, to compete for a prize relating to the conduction of heat in homogeneous bodies with constant conductivity coecients (the prize was not assigned), but that remained unknown until 1876, when
Richard Dedekind who has found it in Riemann's Nachlaÿ together with the Habilitationsvortrag published it in the rst edition of Riemann's work.
In order to address the question posed by the academy, Riemann had to bring a system of partial dierential equations into its simplest form. The problem turned out to be equivalent to that of reducing a quadratic dierential from a i,i dx i dx i (where a i,i represent conductivity coecients), into the form dx 2 i with constant coecients, by a mere change of the independent variables x i (where i = 1, 2, 3) (Riemann, 1861 /1876 , 392, tr. Farwell, 1990 ).
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Since it would be tedious to try various transformations of variables to establish the possibility of such a reduction, Riemann wanted to nd a general criterion of transformability (see Farwell, 1990) . For this purpose he introduced a four-index symbol (ιι , ι ι ) containing the rst and and the second partial derivatives of the functions a i,i respect to the x i . Then he showed that a quadratic dierential form can be transformed in one with constant coecients if the four-index symbol vanishes: (ιι , ι ι )= 0 (Riemann, 1861 /1876 , 402, tr. Farwell, 1990 ). Riemann found a criterion for distinguishing between the case in which the non-constancy of the conductivity coecients a i,i is a mere appearance of the mathematical description and the case in which it corresponds to a real physical dierence, i.e. to a thermally non-homogeneous body.
Riemann hints, although vaguely, at a geometrical interpretation of this mathematical apparatus. The quadratic form ι,ι b ι,ι ds ι ds ι can be regarded as the line element in a more general space of n dimensions extending beyond the bounds of our intuition (Riemann, 1861 /1876 , 435, tr. Farwell, 1990 . A at space can be represented by a quadratic dierential form, whose coecients are non-constant, such as polar coordinates or more complicated curvilinear coordinates. This dierence however does not have any geometrical meaning; it is always possible to nd a transformation of variables with which the form b ι,ι ds ι ds ι can be transformed into one constant coecients ι d 2 ι (Riemann, 1861 /1876 , 435, tr. Farwell, 1990 . In a non-at space, on the contrary, such a transformation cannot be found.
The four-index symbol furnishes a precise mathematical criterion: when it vanishes the non-constancy of the coecients is merely an artifact of the system of variables used, if not, the non-constancy has, so to say, geometrical substance. Geometrically the four-index symbol corresponds then to the measure of the curvature of this surface at the point (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) (Riemann, 1861 /1876 , 435, tr. Farwell, 1990 . In his 1854 lecture Riemann had famously shown that this is not necessarily constant, opening the possibility of space with a variable curvature. Spaces of constant curvature are merely a special case, where independence of bodies from position is assured (Riemann, 1854 (Riemann, /1868 tr. 1873, 36) .
The Commentatio seems however to make clear that Riemann's main concern was capable of being expressed in a purely analytical way i.e. independently 1 For sake of historical accuracy along the paper we will try to remain faithful to the original notations used by the various authors considered. from its possible physical or geometrical interpretation as the problem of the equivalence of dierential quadratic forms. This problem, which is best known as the Äquivalenzproblem , exerted a profound inuence on the later development of mathematics and physics, as the development of absolute dierential calculus (Tonolo, 1961; Struik, 1993) (Helmholtz, 1870 (Helmholtz, /1883 and in other philosophical papers that followed (Helmholtz, , 1879 . In 1886 Sophus Lie (Lie, 1886) , stimulated by Felix Klein, reinterpreted and corrected Helmholtz's result on the basis of his theory of continuous groups. In 1887 Henri Poincaré (who already insisted on the group-theoretical approach on rigid motions in the early 1880s; Poincaré, 1882, 2), referred to Lie's results in his st paper on the foundations of geometry (Poincaré, 1887, 214) . At the end of the paper, Poincaré hints to the celebrated Memoire of Riemann, in which every geometry is characterized through the expression of the arc element as a function of the coordinates (Poincaré, 1887, 214) . However, he discarded it as geometrically irrelevant, because it allows for spaces which exclude the existence of a group of motion which does not alter distances (Poincaré, 1887, 214, see also Poincaré, 1891, 773) .
In general, Riemann's speculations about variably curved spaces (with the notorious exception of Cliord, 1876) were either ignored or dismissed (Hawkins, 1980 (Hawkins, , 2000 . Rather, Riemann's paper triggered developments in the non-geometrical branch of mathematics concerned with the study of quadratic dierential forms.
Dedekind had mentioned Riemann's unpublished Habilitationsvortrag to Erwin Bruno Christoel, which in 1862 lled Dedekind's post at ETH in Zurich (Butzer, 1981) .
In the last paragraph of the paper published in 1869 on Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik (the celebrated Crelle's Journal), Über die Transformation der homogenen Dierentialausdrücke zweiten Grades (Christoel, 1869) , Christoel in fact referred briey to an essay [Abhandlung] in Riemann's Nachlass (Christoel, 1869 ). Christoel's paper addressed the equivalence problem for two quadratic dierential forms in the most general way, without focusing on special case the reducibility to an expression with constant coecients (Ehlers, 1981 Christoel symbols respectively of rst and second kind; Reich, 1994; Herbert, 1991 Ricci's calculus apparently failed in nding his audience among dierential geometers, who were probably its main target (Roth, 1942, 266; Reich, 1994 , 77, but see Bottazzini, 1999 (Bianchi, 1902, 149 ; on the relations Bianchi-Ricci see Toscano, 2001 ).
It is usually argued that only General Relativity eventually did justice to Ricci's work. Einstein's progressive appropriation of the work of Riemann, Christoel, Ricci, and Levi-Civita has been of course discussed several times in historical literature (see for instance: Earman and Glymour, 1978; Stachel, 1980 Stachel, /2002 Norton, 1984; Janssen and Renn, 2007; Pais, 1982, 212.) ). We will here only give a very supercial presentation in order to emphasize some elements that will be relevant to understanding the subsequent philosophical discussion.
Einstein, Grossmann and the Absolute Dierential Calculus. In 1907
Einstein put forward the Principle of Equivalence as an extension of the Relativity Principle to uniformly accelerated systems (Einstein, 1907) . After having embraced
Minkowski's geometrical interpretation of special relativity, in 1912 Einstein, as he later recalled (Einstein, 1922) , had grasped the decisive idea: the analogy between his work on extending the principle of relativity to accelerated motion with Gauss's theory of surfaces, without being aware at that time of the work of Riemann, Ricci, and Levi-Civita (Einstein, 1922 Relativitätsheorie und einer Theorie der Gravitation (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913 ). Einstein's Entwurf theory (just as his nal general theory of relativity)
is built around a quadratic dierential form ds 2 = g µν dx µ dx ν that assumes the name of metric tensor or fundamental tensor (which corresponds to Ricci's covariant system of second rank Einstein and Grossmann, 1913, 25, n.) . The physical novelty consisted of course in the fact that the coecients g µν of the quadratic differential form represent the behavior of measuring-rods and clocks with reference to the coordinate system, as well as the potentials of the gravitational eld. The geodesic trajectories of particles can be considered as the solutions to the variational problem δ ´d s = 0.
Grossman/Einstein's problem can be formulated as follows: What dierential equations permit us to determine the quantities g µν i.e., the gravitational eld? (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913 , 11) Einstein's strategy was famously to seek for a generally covariant analogon of the Poisson's equation
∂z 2 = 4πkρ. The ten potentials g µν = g νµ play the role of the single potential ϕ, whereas the density ρ corresponds to the ten components of a second rank tensor Θ µν , the so-called stress-energy tensor. The problem was to nd a second rank tensor Γ µν , constructed only from the g µν and their rst and second derivatives with respect to the coordinates (just like the Poisson's equation equation involves the second derivative of the potential), which should then play the role of the gravitational tensor: Thus the eld equations would likely have the form κ · Θ µν = Γ µν where κ is a constant (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913, 11) .
As the Zurich Notebook reveals, Grossman had immediately found a tensor of fourth manifold (Tensor vierter Mannigfalgkeit) (ik, lm) using the four-indexsymbol notation as the only tensor that can contains only the metric tensor and its rst and second derivatives (Sauer, 2005) . It turned out to be much more complicated to nd the exact form of the covariant dierential tensor of second rank and second order (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913, 36) , obtained from the Riemann-Christoel tensor by contraction (that is by setting unlike indices equal) that could play the role of the gravitational tensor (having the same valence and rank of the matter tensor).
Einstein and Grossman discarded the natural candidate, the so called RicciTensor (Maltese, 1991) , since it does not reduce to ∆φ, that is to the Newtonian limit (assumed erroneously as spatially at), in the case of weak static eld (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913, 337) . In the subsequent years Einstein gave up general covariance for the equations of gravitational eld. An argument, which came to be known as the hole argument, even convinced Einstein that, as he wrote to Paul Ehrenfest in early 1914, generally covariant eld equations that determine the eld completely from the matter tensor cannot exist at all (CPAE, Doc. 512, 5, 563). 3 In March of the same year Einstein even wrote to Michele Besso that [t]he general theory of invariants only acted as a hindrance (CPAE, 5, Doc. 514, 604) .
In October 1914, Einstein, who in the meantime had moved to Berlin, presented a systematic exposition of the Entwurf theory to the Berlin Academy Die formale Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie (Einstein, 1914) . 7, Geodesic line or equations of the point motion, introduced a fundamental formal innovation, using the absolute dierential calculus to express the equation of the geodesic line independently of the coordinate using the Christoel symbols (Einstein, 1914 (Einstein, , 1044 .):
After giving presentation of the hole argument in 12, in 13 Einstein still restricts the covariance only to linear transformations in order to ensure a unique relation between g µν and T µν (Einstein, 1914 (Einstein, , 1066 .
Generally Covariant Field Equations. In the meantime the theory, that
had initially received rather suspiciously by physicists, began to attract the interest of mathematicians such as Levi-Civita himself (Cattani and De Maria, 1989) and David Hilbert (Corry, 2003) . Under the pressure of a hasty competition with the latter, by November of 1915 Einstein regained general covariance for its eld equations, which he had abandoned with a heavy heart (Einstein, 1915d, 778) three years before and presented them in four communications to the Prussian Academy (Einstein, 1915c,d,a,b) . In the rst of three papers presented to the Berlin Academy he famously described General Theory of Relativity: as a real triumph of the method of the general dierential calculus founded by Gauss, Riemann, Christoel, Ricci, and Levi-Civiter [sic] (Einstein, 1915d, 778 ).
Einstein came rst to consider again the Ricci tensor, R µν as the left-side of his equations, that had to be equated to the matter tensor T µν . The matter tensor is however divergence-free, expressing the conservation of energy, stress, and momentum, whereas the divergence of the Ricci tensor is generally non-zero.
is divergence-free. The tensor G µν (later labeled Einstein tensor) has all the required properties is therefore suitable for a role of the gravitation tensor of the nal eld equations: G µν = −κT µν (Mehra, 1974; Pais, 1982, 20) . As Einstein explained to Hilbert in November 1915:
The diculty was not in nding the generally covariant equations from the gµν for this is easily achieved with the aid of the Riemann's tensor. 3 Einstein discovered that generally covariant eld equations it is impossible to achieve a univocal determination of the gµν out of the Tµν (CPAE 5, Doc. 484; Einstein to P. Ehrenfest, second half of November 1913), the tensor representing the matter source. Not only general covariance allows to construct two solutions of the gravitational eld equations gµν (x) the g µν (x ) in dierent coordinate systems x and x (which very rst thing that one learn from absolute dierential calculus), but also two solutions gµν (x) and g µν (x) in the same coordinate system x;
the eld equations seem to attribute dierent eld values of the eld quantities for the same point (identied through unprimed coordinate system), violating the law of causality (see for instance Norton, 1987) .
Rather, it was hard to recognize that these equations are a generalization, and precisely, a simple and natural generalization of Newton's law. It has just been in the last few weeks that I succeeded in this (I sent you my rst communication)
4 whereas 3 years ago with my friend Grossmann, I
had already taken into consideration the only possible generally covariant equations, which have now been shown to be the correct ones (Einstein to Hilbert, November 18, 1915; CAPE 8a, Doc. 148, 201 ). (28.11.1915; CPAE, 8a, Doc. 153, 207-208; Norton, 2003; Janssen, 2008) .
A free material point moves with uniform motion in a straight line, relative to a system in which the g µν are constant (Γ τ µν = 0). If a new co-ordinates is smoothly introduced, the g µν will no longer be constant, but functions of the coordinates (Γ τ µν = 0); the motion of the free material point will present itself in the new coordinates as curvilinear non-uniform motion. Via the principle of equivalence, we can equally interpret this motion as a motion under the inuence of a gravitational eld.
As Einstein summarizes in the nal 1916 polished presentation of the theory, published in the Annalen der Physik (Einstein, 1916b) , it is then natural to extend this reasoning to the case when we are no longer able by a suitable choice of coordinates to apply the special theory of relativity to a nite region, that is when the Γ τ µν cannot be made to vanish identically, since Riemann-Christoel tensor R ρ µντ does not vanish (Norton, 1985) .
Interestingly, even if Einstein does refer to the non-Euclidean geometry, in the 1916 paper the Riemann-Christoel tensor R ρ µντ does not carry most of the geometrical implications that we take for granted today; in particular Einstein does not refer to the curvature of spacetime (Reich, 1994, 204f.) . The Riemann tensor is introduced in so far that it is the only tensor that can be constructed solely from the fundamental tensor without going beyond the second derivatives of the g µν (as the analogy with the Poisson's equations requires).
A geometrical issue emerges rather when one has to compare the values of the g µν predicted by the eld equations (let say the Schwarzschild-solution) with the observed values. Till the end of his life Einstein insisted on assuming provisionally (Howard, 1990 (Howard, , 2005 ) that these can be obtained by direct measurement using small rods and atomic clocks whose length and rate are independent of the gravitational eld they are embedded in (Stachel, 1989) . Roughly, the g µν are the numbers to which we have to multiply the coordinate distances so that ds 2 has the same absolute value (up to the global choice of unit of measure) everywhere on the manifold. (Einstein, 1916a, 641) , but the two terms taken separately are not. In particular the rst term of the geodesic equation can be taken as representing the Galilean inertia, and the second term with the Christoel symbols, as representing inuence of the gravitational eld upon the mass point (Einstein, 1916a, 641) . Neither of these per se has physical meaning, only their sum does.
In Einstein's eyes the covariance principle and the equivalence principle appear then as deeply connected: the variability of g µν and the non-vanishing of the Γ τ µν introduced by a coordinate transformation can be interpreted arbitrarily as an acceleration eld or as a (homogeneous) gravitational eld: the requirement of general covariance of equations embraces the principle of equivalence as a quite special case (Einstein, 1916a, 641) . Einstein explicitly embraced the view that the gravitational eld is a coordinate-dependent quantity (Einstein, 1918a, 699f .; see Janssen, 2011) .
The most famous objection against Einstein's use of the absolute dierential calculus was of course that which was raised by Erich Kretschmann in 1917 (Kretschmann, 1917) . The principle of general covariance as complete coordinate generality in the formulation of a physical theory, has no particular physical content, and thus it has nothing to do with a principle of relativity. In fact according to Ricci and Levi-Civita's investigations (Kretschmann, 1917, 579 ) every space-time theory can be formulated in a general co-variant way, only by inserting the g µν ad the Γ τ µν into the equations of the theory (more on this topic Rynasiewicz, 1999; Norton, 2003) .
In a 1918 paper, Einstein agreed with Kretschman's claim, emphasizing nevertheless the heuristic value of general covariance when combined with a principle of simplicity (Einstein, 1918c) .
A more compelling answer was provided by Hermann Weyl in the rst edition of Raum-Zeit-Materie (Weyl, 1918b) . Even if every theory can be rewritten in a general covariant form, in pre-general-relativistic theories such as special relativity, the metric displays the pre-asseigned Minkowski values g ik and the Γ i hl vanish everywhere; in General Relativity one nds these values only after having solved the eld equations: This seals the doom of the Idea that a geometry may exist independently of physics in the traditional sense (Weyl, 1918b, 174 ).
Weyl could make this point clear exploiting the geometrical implications of tensor calculus which were developed in those years under the stimulus of General Relativity. In 1916 , Levi-Civita (Levi-Civita, 1916 , but see also Hessenberg, 1917/18 and Schouten, 1919) had famously recognized the geometrical meaning of the Christoel symbols as determining the parallel displacement of vectors (Struik, 1989; Reich, 1992) . A displacement preserving the direction of a vector can be expressed in general coordinates precisely by the fact that the Christoel Symbols can be made to vanish along the path; thus roughly, referring to the displacement operation, the Γ i hl turned out to be expressible without referring to g ik . The absolute dierential calculus can then be the founded geometrically. When a vector in a Euclidean space is parallel-transported around a loop, it will always return to its original position (Γ i hl vanish overall on the manifold). However, this property does not hold in the general case. The Riemann curvature tensor measures precisely the change in the direction (but not in magnitude as in Weyl's more general non-Riemannian geometry Weyl 1918s) of a vector after it is transported around a closed loop (Weyl, 1918b, 16) . Along a geodesic path the vector will remaiǹ unchanged', so that a geodesic line can be dened in a non metrical-way as the straightest line rather than the line of extremal length (Weyl, 1918b, 17) .
In the third revised edition of Raum-Zeit-Materie published in 1919, the Christoffel Symbols Γ i sr = Γ i rs are considered as the components of an ane connection (Weyl, 1919, 101) . Exactly because it is not a tensor, the ane connection provides an adequate representation of the fact required by Einstein's interpretation of the equivalence principle: there is no unique decomposition of the connection into an inertial background plus a gravitational eld (Stachel, 2007) . In 1920 Weyl introduced the celebrated expression guiding eld (Führungsfeld ) for the ane connection: General Relativity does make every motions relative, eliminating the structure responsible for the distinction between geodesic and non geodesic worldlines; Einstein's theory rather transformed such a constraining guidance, in a physical force-eld, in which according to Einstein, inertia and gravitation constitute a inseparable unity (Weyl, 1920) . Motion along a geodesic path or deection from a geodesic path, are absolutely dierent, but can be interpreted arbitrarily as the eect of inertia or gravitation.
In 1920, in the unpublished paper Grundgedanken und Methoden der Relativitätstheorie in ihrer Entwicklung dargestellt (CPAE 7, Doc. 31 ). Einstein, using a celebrated analogy with electromagnetic eld which can be split dierently into electric and magnetic components by dierent observers, came to recognize that the crucial point of General Relativity is the fact that the gravitational eld only has a relative existence (CPAE 7, Doc. 31, p. 21; Janssen, 2005 Janssen, , 2008 .
In the Princeton Lectures, published in the same year, Einstein emphasized again that this is well represented by the fact that the intensity of the gravitational eld is expressed by the quantities Γ i kl , which do not have a tensor character (Einstein, 1921b ) and thus are coordinate-dependent. Moreover, Einstein recognized that this could become completely clear only after Levi-Civita rightly pointed out that it is the innitesimal displacement eld Γ i kl that should be considered as primary and not to the metric g ik (Einstein, 1921b; see Stachel, 2007) .
In the early 1920s, Élie Cartan, starting from the Levi-Civita's geometrical notion of parallel displacement, considered gravity, mathematically represented by the ane connection, as the structure reconciling the dierent orientations of local inertial frames (Cartan, 1923 (Cartan, , 1924b (Cartan, , 1925 . From this point of view, according to Cartan, relativity faces the paradoxical task of interpreting, in a non-homogeneous universe, all the results of so many experiences by observers who believe in homogeneity of the universe (Cartan, 1924a, 81) . At this point, it might be said, the connection of Ricci's calculus with Riemann's original geometrical approach is restored. With General Relativity, as Levi-Civita noticed some years later, clearly hinting to Bianchi's words, Ricci's calculus revealed itself to be not only useful but truly indispensable (Levi-Civita, 1925 , 11, tr. 1927 (Schlick, 1917a) . The work appeared in the same year in the book (Schlick, 1917b) , which received four dierent editions up till 1922 (see Schlick, 1922 Schlick, /2006 (Schlick, 1917a ).
Einstein, as it is well known, was very pleased by Schlick's paper and his opinion was as well very positive for the book version (Howard, 1984) . However, as early as 1920 in his rst monograph on relativity, Hans Reichenbach, who had attended Einstein's lectures on General Relativity in Berlin in the late 1910s, had raised a rather convincing objection against a conventionalist approach to General Relativity.
Conventionalism, Reichenbach argued, works only for spaces of constant curvature. In every of such spaces there is the a unique (up to a constant positive factor i.e. up to the choice of a unit of length) set of congruence relations so that each such set of congruence relations is inconsistent with any other such set.
Conventionalism is then based precisely on the idea that one can make an arbitrary choice among one of such sets, that is as to which gures all observers agree on as being congruent.
In Riemannian geometry of variable curvature no unique set of congruence relations can be dened all over the space, so the very idea of a unique conventional choice among alternative congruent relations does not make sense. For this reason, Reichenbach points out, Poincaré excludes from the beginning Riemannian geometry, because it does not permit the displacement of a body without change of form (Reichenbach, 1920b, 104, n. 1; tr. 1965, 109, 1; translation modied) . In the general case only the unit of length is globally available on a Riemannian manifold (all observers can agree per convention of using, for instance, the centimeter as unit of measure), in contrast to a non-Riemannian is Weyl's geometry that where a separate unit of length at every point of space may be dened.
According to Reichenbach, Einstein's general theory, adopting the Riemannian approach, leads rather to an absolutely objective determination of the structure of space (Reichenbach, 1920a, 405; tr. 2006, 29) . Even if we are free to choose the coordinate system, only the properties which are independent of a particular coordinate system are physically meaningful: Relativity does not mean the abandoning of a judgment, but the liberation of the objective sense of knowledge from its distortion through our subjective nature (Reichenbach, 1920a, 405; tr. 2006, 29 
The coecients gµν occurring in [the mixed quadratic dierential form] manifest themselves in the acceleration of the second coordinate system relative to the inertial system; since this acceleration directly characterizes the gravitational eld of the second system, we may regard it as a measure of this gravitational eld. We notice, therefore, that the transition from a gravity-free eld to a gravitational eld is connected with a transition to non-Euclidean coordinates, and that the metric of these coordinates is a measure of the gravitational eld (Reichenbach, 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 24) .
Reichenbach is however careful to emphasize that [s]uch a space is only apparently non-Euclidean ; actually it does not dier structurally from Euclidean space (Reichenbach, 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 25) . It is, on the contrary, the very same at spacetime that can be expressed in terms of non-Euclidean coordinates (Reichenbach, 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 25) , where the g µν are not constant but functions of the coordinates.
Einstein identied the presence of the gravitational eld with the non-constancy of g µν . As Reichenbach observes, the transition is made from the special theory to the general theory of relativity, can be considered as a far reaching extrapolation (Reichenbach, 1920b, 24; tr. 1965, 26 ; my emphasis). Einstein inferred from this that every gravitational eld, not only that which is produced by transformation, manifests itself by a deviation from Euclidean geometry (Reichenbach, 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 24) . The presence of gravitation manifests itself in the non-constancy of the g µν , also in the case where it is not possible to choose the coordinates in such a way that the line element becomes Euclidean at all points simultaneously (Reichenbach, 1920b, 27; tr. 1965, 29) . This is the signicance of the introduction of a quadratic form with variable coecients:
The special position of the mixed quadratic form of the line element can also be characterized in the following way. The ten functions gµν determining the metric are not absolutely xed, but depend on the choice of the coordinates. They are not independent of one another, however, and if four of them are given, the coordinates as well as the other six functions are determined. This dependence expresses the absolute character of the curvature of space. The metric functions gµν are not relative; that is, their choice is not arbitrary (Reichenbach, 1920b, 27; tr. 1965, 29;  my emphasis).
If one covers a at space with any any curved oblique coordinates, then the line element will become a mixed quadratic expression. Even the ordinary polar coordinates furnish an expression diering from the pure quadratic sum for the line element (Reichenbach, 1920b, 24; tr. 1965, 25) . Thus, even the very simple representation of Euclidean space by means of polar coordinates can be conceived as a projection upon a non-Euclidean space (Reichenbach, 1920b, 24; tr. 1965, 25) . In polar coordinates the g µν are not constant. However the Riemannian measure of curvature of this system will be zero at every point (Reichenbach, 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 25) . The lines of the co-ordinate grid are curved, but not the surface itself.
Cartesian coordinates, where the g µν has constant values, can be reintroduced by simple coordinate transformation. By contrast, on a non-at non-Euclidean space it is impossible to preserve its simple Euclidean form (Reichenbach, 1920b, 94; tr. 1965, 99) . Cartesian coordinates simply do not exist:
the four space-time coordinates can be chosen arbitrarily, but that the ten metric functions gµν may not be assumed arbitrarily ; they have denite values for every choice of coordinates . . . If the metric were a purely subjective matter, then the Euclidean metric would have to be suitable for physics; as a consequence, all ten functions gµν could be selected arbitrarily. However, the theory of relativity teaches that the metric is subjective only insofar as it is dependent upon the arbitrariness of the choice of coordinates, and that independently of them it describes an objective property of the physical world (Reichenbach, 1920b, 86-87; tr. 1965, 90-91) As Reichenbach recognizes, the mathematical apparatus of Riemannian geometry is mainly concerned with the problem of establishing when dierent sets of g µν represent dierent geometries, and when they are merely the consequence of the coordinate system used. As we have seen, Riemann, Christoel and Ricci had found in the so called Riemann-Christoel tensor an absolute criterion for distinguishing the class of dierent g µν -systems that diers only by a coordinate transformation from other classes.
Hence, the freedom in the choice of the coordinate system has of course nothing to do with the freedom in the choice of geometry:
It is true that the metric contains a subjective element, and depending on the choice of the system of reference, the metric coecients will vary; this indeterminacy [Unbestimmtheit] still holds in the gravitational eld.
But there exist dependency relations among the metric coecients, and if four of them are arbitrarily given for the whole space, then the other six are determined by transformation formulas. . . . That something exists manifests itself in the dependency relations between the metric coecients; since we can discover these relations by means of measurementsand only by means of themwe can discover the real. It is the essence of the general theory of relativity that the metric is much more than a mathematical measurement of bodies; it is the form by means of which the body is described as an element in the material world. (Reichenbach, 1920b, 96-97; tr. 1965, 102 ; my emphasis)
The existence of such indeterminacy raised a major philosophical problem that lies in the background of Einstein's hole argument and that rapidly came to appear most often in the literature of (Pauli, 1921, 56 ) in Hilbert's version as the rst treatment of the Cauchy problem in General Relativity. Reichenbach seems here to insist rather on the fact that the existence of such non-physical degrees of freedom does not reect any lack of determinacy of the geometrical structure of the world.
Reichenbach came then to the conclusion that the metric contains a subjective aspect which depends on the choice of the coordinate system and objective one, which is expressed in the dependencies among the metric coecients.
In a way somehow similar to that of Arthur Eddington (Eddington, 1920) , the still Kantian Reichenbach emphasizes the epistemological signicance of the use of tensor calculus. The philosophical meaning of the Riemannian analytic metric is that it presents the mathematical technique to isolate those elements which have objective physical signicances, from those which are merely artifacts of the coordinates: invariance with respect to the transformations characterizes the objective content of reality, the structure of reason expresses itself in the arbitrariness of admissible systems (Reichenbach, 1920b, 86; tr. 1965 Only with regard to the arbitrariness of the co-ordinates is space as an ideal structure; metric, however, expresses an objective property of reality. This conception does not contradict conventionalism. Schlick must not be interpreted as saying that a certain metric has been prescribed; a metric emerges only after the physical laws have been established (the P of Einstein's formula). One can also change the metric, provided one changes the laws of physics correspondingly (Reichenbach, 1921, 356; tr. 1878, I, 34f.; my emphasis)
Reichenbach considered Schlick's position (see Schlick's commetary in Helmholtz, 1921) as correctly reproducing Einstein's famous claim (Einstein, 1921a ) that only the sum G + P of geometry and physics is testable by experience (Reichenbach, 1921, 355; 1878, I, 33 ).
As we have mentioned, Logical Empiricists failed to notice Einstein's reference to Poincaré (Einstein, 1921a) and Helmholtz (Einstein, 1925) should be read in the context of Einstein's measuring rod objection against Weyl's theory of electromagnetism (Weyl, 1918a; Einstein, 1918b) , rather as an argument for geometrical conventionalism. However, the joint authority of Einstein and Schlick was sucient to induce Reichenbach to conclude, already in a paper published in French in 1922 (Reichenbach, 1922 (Reichenbach, , tr. 2006 , that [t]he solution to the problem of space is therefore found only in this conception we call conventionalism and which goes back to Helmholtz and Poincaré (Reichenbach, 1922, 40; tr. 2006; 135 ).
Reichenbach's position is well-known. If the measurements with rigid rods yield a non-Euclidean geometry, one could, alternatively, maintain that the geometry of space-time was Euclidean holding that measuring instruments are actually non rigid, deformed by a non-detectable force of type X, which causes uniform shrinkages and expansions in all materials. According to Reichenbach, the the real problem lies in deciding between these alternatives: either Euclidean geometry and a eld X or the geometry determined by experience and no eld X (Reichenbach, 1922, 40; tr. 2006; 135) The empirical facts can force us to select either the Euclidean or the non-Euclidean description as the uniquely correct description.
Of course, gravitation, in Reichenbach's terminology is a force of type X, (Reichenbach, 1922, 41; tr. 2006; 132) ; as consequence of the identity of inertial and gravitational mass, it aects all bodies in the same way. Einstein's choice to set X = 0 (Reichenbach, 1922, 43; tr. 2006; 129) and abandon Euclidean geometry was the most simple choice, but not the only one possible. In principle, another more complicated alternative would have been plausible. According to Reichenbach, the very existence of this alternative represent the characteristic of the epistemological solutions for which we are indebted to the theory of relativity (Reichenbach, 1922, 40; tr. 2006; 135) .
When, however, Reichenbach describes in some detail why gravitation is is force of type X a dierent alternative comes to fore:
It is also in this fashion that we can obtain the remarkable identication of gravitation with certain ctitious forces that result from a change in coordinates. Imagine a gravitation-free space in which we nd a system of coordinates formed by a network of congruent rigid rods. In this space the metric is Euclidean; that is to say the gµν possess the well-known special form [ds
If we now introduce new coordinates such that the rods get progressively shorter the farther to the exterior a rod is, so that the network will be considered to be curved, then the new gµν take a form dierent from the special form. This can be conceived of in the following way: there exists a force which shrinks the rods and this force is represented by the deviation of the gµν from the special form; it is therefore considered to be a correction in the establishment of the ds 2 .
It is clear that this force . . . is only a ctitious force produced by the anomaly of the rods. All of the magnitudes that, in an element of the network, are measured with a local unit undergo the same correction ;
this is precisely the motivation for considering this ctitious force to be interpreted as a gravitational eld (Reichenbach, 1922, 39; tr. 2006; 134;  my emphasis).
In the example considered by Reichenbach, one is not in front of alternative geometries; it is the very same at geometry in dierent coordinate systems. A matter free region of spacetime appears as devoid of gravitation from the perspective of one coordinate system and endowed with a gravitational eld when considered from another coordinate system: the dierence is one of description. Gravitation is a ctitious force because it is coordinate-dependent: as Reichenbach's writes the gravitational eld and the corrections resulting from a simple change in coordinates can be brought together in a single concept (Reichenbach, 1922, 39; tr. 2006; 134) .
This of course the very core of the equivalence principle as Einstein originally presented it. As Reichenbach explains, although only in a brief footnote, it is necessary here to draw a distinction between the gravitational potential and the gravitational eld, that is between the gravitational potentials (the g µν ) and [i]ts gradient, the eld (Reichenbach, 1922, 39, n.; tr. 2006; 134, n.) . The components of the metric represents the gravitational potentials, whereas, as in other eld theories, the gradient of the potentials is the natural candidate for representing the gravitational eld.
What distinguishes the gravitational eld from other elds is the fact that in a at region of space-time non-constant potentials g µν can be introduced by a simple change in coordinates. The transition to the General Theory of Relativity is realized by the assumption that such a representation of the eld by the nonconstancy of the functions g µν , is also justied in the general case in which the metric cannot be reduced to quasi-Euclidean form of the special theory of relativity by a simple change in coordinates.
In his more technical writing Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1924) , Reichenbach emphasizes that what characterizes a local inertial system is the fact that the gradient of the metric ∂gµν ∂xσ can be made to vanish by a coordinate transformation , whereas in a general gravitational eld this is impossible , as the gradient of the metric ∂ 2 gµν ∂xσ∂xρ does not vanish. However Reichenbach's philosophical conclusion is stunningly dierent (cf. Reichenbach, 1924, 106; tr. 1965, 133) .
Focusing on what he now calls metrical forces (Reichenbach, 1924, 68; tr. 1965, 87 ) (because they depend on the choice of the metric), Reichenbach is convinced that space and time in the General Theory of Relativity mean the same as in the special theory although without any metric (Reichenbach, 1924, 155; tr. 1965, 195) ; the topological properties turn out to be more constant that the metrical one, so that Reichenbach famously argues that the transition from the special theory to the general one represents merely a renunciation of metrical characteristics, while the fundamental topological character of space and time remains the same. (Reichenbach, 1924, 155; tr. 1965, 195) In the immediately subsequent years, Logical Empiricists came rapidly to agree on the fact that such an opposition between the topological and the metrical properties of spacetime is the relevant innovation introduced by General Relativity. Carnap, in his rst post-doctoral writings (Carnap, 1923 (Carnap, , 1925 , could easily translate into an empiricist framework his early Kantian conventionalism (Carnap, 1922) .
Only topological space reproduces what is present in experience uni-vocally. By contrast, all post-topological structure depends upon a stipulation.
It is undeniable that the idea was philosophically appealing. In every physical theory we can distinguish on the one hand a factual element determined by experience on which a class of empirically equivalent theories agree and on the other a conventional element determined pragmatically as the simplest theory in the class. Simplicity has of course no intrinsic connection with truth. In the standard Logical Empiricist view, the development of science appeared then to be marked by the progressive discovery that there are certain elements of knowledge . . . which are not governed by the idea of truth, but which are due to volitional resolutions (Reichenbach, 1938, 9 ; my emphasis).
Reichenbach's Mature Conventionalism and the Analytic Treatment of Riemannian Spaces
In 1926, Reichenbach had already nished his semi-popular Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1926 , but published only as Reichenbach, 1928 , tr. Reichenbach, 1958 , which furnishes a very elegant and eective presentation of this doctrine and of the noble tradition from which it emerges:
This conception of the problem of geometry is essentially the result of the work of Riemann, Helmholtz, and Poincaré and is known as conventionalism. While Riemann prepared the way for an application of geometry to physical reality by his mathematical formulation the concept of space, Helmholtz laid the philosophical foundations. In particular, he recognized the connection of the problem of geometry with that of rigid bodies . . . It is Einstein's achievement to have applied the theory of the relativity of geometry to physics. The surprising result was the fact that the world is non-Euclidean, as the theorists of relativity are wont to say; in our language this means: if F = 0, the geometry G becomes non-Euclidean. This outcome had not been anticipated, and Helmholtz and Poincaré still believed that the geometry obtained could not be proved to be dierent from Euclidean geometry. Only Einstein's theory of gravitation predicted the non-Euclidean result which was conrmed by astronomical observations (Reichenbach, 1928, 48; tr. 1958, 35) .
According to what Reichenbach calls theorem θ, a non-Euclidean geometry G is equivalent to an Euclidean geometry G with a eld of universal forces F . Only the combination G + F is testable by experience, after a conventional choice has been made. Einstein chose the most simple convention by setting F = 0.
The action of such a force is not completely arbitrary. In order to avoid causal anomalies (Reichenbach, 1928, 12 ) the original geometry G must be mapped into the new one G uniquely and continuously. The very lesson that we can are draw from Einstein's theory is that we are free to chose among topologically equivalent, but metrically dierent spaces, that can be smoothly deformed into one-another, by some force F that aect all bodes. The metrical relations are distorted (Reichenbach, 1928, 48; tr. 1958, 35) , whereas the topological structure remained untouched. According to Reichenbach, the world as it is in-itself does not have a unique metric; it does, however, have a unique topology, and this is dened in terms of the causal relations.
Reichenbach believes that Riemann had set the mathematical framework for this philosophical conclusion. Riemann's mathematical achievement is of greatest signicance for the epistemological problem of space (Reichenbach, 1928, 244; tr. 1958, 279f.) . The mathematical treatment divides the description of a space into a topological and a metrical part: the function of numbering is assigned to the coordinate system; whereas the metrical functions of measuring lengths that are assigned to the metrical coecients g µν (Reichenbach, 1928, 244; tr. 1958, 280) on the other. In Riemannian geometry the metrical function of the g µν plays a subordinate role. It cannot change the topological foundation determined by the coordinate system. It merely adds to it a metrical superstructure [Überbau] (Reichenbach, 1928, 244; tr. 1958, 280) . 4.1. Reichenbach's Technical Presentation of Riemannian Geometry and its Incompatibility with his own Conventionalism. In Reichenbach's view Riemann deprived the coordinate system of all but topological properties. This interpretation seems however to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding. Indeed, in Riemannian geometry coordinates have per se no metrical signicance; they are only a set of markers that serve to distinguish the points. Yet such a signicance is regained by the introduction of a quadratic dierential form with variable coecients g µν as function of the coordinates. Instead of separating the metric and topological signicance of the coordinate system, Riemannian geometry shows that there is no other source of information about the coordinates apart from the g µν .
One is free to introduce any coordination of the physical space that is produced by an arbitrary, if only, smooth transformation from the original. However, this transformation is accompanied by a suitable change of the g µν , so that that the ds 2 are unchanged; all measured relations can be recovered in the new coordinate system by using the new g µν to get real distances from coordinate distances. The numbers g µν indicate how, at a given place, the length of the line element is to be calculated from the coordinate dierentials (Reichenbach, 1928, 243; tr. 1958, 279) .
As Reichenbach has explained in his 1920 monograph, the coordinate system is arbitrary, however the dependency of the g µν from the coordinate system has an objective meaning. This still emerges clearly from Reichenbach's own presentation of the Analytic Treatment of Riemannian Spaces in his 1926/1928 book:
This fact is expressed analytically by a property of the gµν , as we shall see when we investigate transformations to other coordinate systems.
Let us imagine that a second coordinate system has been introduced and that the position of the new family of lines is given as a function of the old coordinates, . . . We now add the restriction that the transition to the new coordinates must not change any of the metrical relations ; this transition, therefore, leads only to a dierent form of description.
We must then specify a new system g µν of metrical coecients relative to the new coordinates x µ such that the old relations of congruence are preserved. If two line segments are equally long when measured by the old gµν in the old coordinate system, they must still be equally long when measured by the new g µν in the new coordinate system. This requirement leads to the condition that
We can therefore say that ds 2 is an invariant of the transformation, and we can show from (8) how the new gµν are to be calculated from the old ones. (Reichenbach, 1928, 281; tr. 1958, 245 ; my emphasis)
As we have seen, a classical example is of course the passage from using Cartesian (rectangular) coordinates to polar coordinates. The points are relabeled, that is labeled with dierent numbers (for instance, in a surface the point whose Cartesian coordinates are (1, 1) has polar coordinates √ 2, π /4). However, regardless of the coordinate system used, the distances between any two pairs of point are assigned the same value. The same at Euclidean metric is expressed in a dierent coordinate system.
Geometrical conventionalism, violated exactly the condition, which in Riemann's approach should be considered as fundamental. This emerges clearly from Reichenbach's attempt to cast the loose language of universal forces in a more formal framework: if the results of measurement yield a metric g µν which is not-Euclidean, then one can infer that the geometry is actually given by the normal matrix g µν , if one stipulates that our measuring rods were under the inuence of a universal force F.
Generally the force F is a tensor. If the g µν are the metrical coecients of the geometry G and gµν those of G, the potentials Fµν of the force F are given by g µν + Fµν = gµν . The measuring rods furnish directly the g µν ; the Fµν are the correction factors by which the g µν , are corrected so that gµν results. The universal force F inuencing the measuring rod is usually dependent on the orientation of the measuring rod (Reichenbach, 1928, 44, n.; tr. 1958, 33) .
Let the g µν represent some non-at geometry;then the introduction of the arbitrary potentials F µν of a universal force eld leads us to conclude that the metric of the space can be reduced to an Euclidean at one g µν : Norton, 1994) . The equation deals precisely with a g µν system which cannot be transformed into g µν by a coordinate transformation if the line element has to be preserved. In fact, if this equation is valid, than trivially the quadratic form is not an invariant ds 2 = g µν dx µ dx ν = g µν dx µ dx ν . If two tracts are congruent when measured by the old g µν in the old coordinate system, then they are not equally long when measured by the new g µν in the new coordinate system. Thus the two geometries can be transformed into one another only if one renounces the invariant character of ds 2 ; in other words,one deprives space of its metrical properties i.e. the structure which tells how much space or time lies between pointevents.
4.2. Reichenbach on Riemann's Äquivalenzproblem . There is a sort of conict between Reichenbach's philosophical intentions and Reichenbach's own popularization of the mathematical apparatus of Riemannian geometry. Philosophically Reichenbach attempted to interpret Riemann's approach from the perspective of Helmholtz's and Poincaré's problem of nding a criterion for making a choice among dierent metrical geometries which only agree on the topological order of all spacepoints determined through the coordinate system (Reichenbach, 1929b, 683) . Riemann's main concern, however, was on the contrary thereof, namely that of nding a criterion to discern the properties of the same metrical geometry that depend on the choice of a coordinate system from those that are coordinate independent.
This can be understood only if one considers Riemann's geometrical insight from the perspective of the non-geometrical development put forward by Christoel and Ricci.
From this vantage point, as again Reichenbach explains very clearly in the less philosophical parts of the book, it appears that Riemann wanted to investigate dierent classes of quadratic dierential forms. Each class, insofar that the line element may be transformed into one another by simple coordinate transformation, represents the same geometry. On the contrary g µν -systems which cannot be transformed into one-another by any change of the coordinates represents a dierent geometries:
We may restate our results as follows: any given system gµν can be transformed into another system gστ , by means of [a smooth change of variables]. Transformations of this kind, starting with a denite set gµν do not give us all conceivable systems, however, but merely a limited class. The systems of this class are geometrically equivalent to the initial gµν , and the class as a whole characterizes a denite geometry. Other classes similarly constructed, would characterize another geometry. A special class is the class which contains the normal system; it is the class of Euclidean geometry (Reichenbach, 1928, 282f.; tr. 1958, 246) .
The very purpose of Riemann's investigation was to decide when two g µν -systems dier only by a coordinate transformation and are therefore geometrically equivalent. Two metrics are equivalent, if and only if there is a coordinate transformation that transforms g µν into g µν so that ds 2 = ds 2 . This is of course precisely the Äquivalenzproblem. As we have seen, it is mainly the merit of Christoel and Ricci, having developed the mathematical technique for dealing with this problem. Reichenbach describes it once again very accurately:
The question now arises whether there exists a special characteristic of the class of Euclidean Geometry. Mathematicians have shown that it is possible to formulate such a criterion. For this purpose one has to form a certain mathematical combination of the gµν and gµν ,
which is called Rµνστ . . . Rµνστ and is therefore a tensor of rank 4.
We can recognize directly . . . a very important property of all tensors,
namely, that if all components of a tensor are zero in one coordinate system, they will all be zero in every other coordinate system. . . . Since it can be shown that Rµνστ , vanishes for the normal system, it follows that every system of the Euclidean class is characterized by the condition
Rµνστ is called the Riemannian curvature tensor. It is a measure of curvature. (Reichenbach, 1928, 283; tr. 1958, 246) As we have seen, R µνστ entails the rst and second derivatives of the g µν . Since it is a tensor, if it vanishes in one coordinate system, it vanishes in all coordinate systems.
All inter-transformable g µν -systems represent the same Euclidean geometry, since in all these cases, even if the g µν can be variable, the Riemann tensor vanishes. On the contrary the Christoel symbols Γ τ µν , which entail the rst derivatives of the g µν , are not tensors. If they vanish in one coordinate system, they do not vanish in another. Hence we cannot expect that the g µν , or the Γ τ µν , should give something of absolute signicance. We have to dierentiate the g µν twice before we arrive at something that has a signicance independent of any special coordinate system.
Relativity of Geometry vs. Relativity of Gravitation
Reichenbach is philosophically convinced the that metrical properties of the space-time continuum are destroyed by gravitational elds (Reichenbach, 1928, 269; tr. 1958, 308) ; since an alternative to Einstein-stipulation would have been in principle possible, space-time has no denite metrical structure. However, once again, following Reichenbach's semi-technical presentation of General Relativity, rather than his philosophical interpretation, one nds a more humble truth: the gravitational elds, merely destroy the orthogonal form of the line element (Reichenbach, 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253) .
Let consider again an inertial frame K without a gravitational eld, that is where the g στ will satisfy the normal matrix. If we now describe the same local world region from an accelerated system K, the g µν of this system can no longer satisfy the normal matrix ; hence the g µν will characterize the acceleration of K (Reichenbach, 1928, 288; tr. 1958, 253) ; but, because of the equivalence principle
[i]f they characterize the state of acceleration of K, (Reichenbach, 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253) , they must also characterize the gravitational eld which exist for K. Of course the geometry of space has not changed in passing from g στ to g µν rather it is the same at Minkowski geometry, represented in dierent coordinate systems (Reichenbach, 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253) .
5.1. The Equivalence Principle and the Christoel-Symbols. As Reichenbach already briey explained in a footnote in his 1922 article, Einstein identied the gravitational eld with the gradient of the potentials g µν , that is with the nonvanishing of the Christoel symbols Γ τ µν . As in every eld theory also in gravitational theory one distinguishes the concepts of potential and gradient; in electricity theory, the force eld is the gradient of the electric potentials; analogously in General Relativity the gravitational force will . . . be characterized by the potential gradient [Potentialgefälle] which can be calculated for every point from the potential eld (Reichenbach, 1928, 268; tr. 1958, 233) .
According to Reichenbach [t] his representation explains why the gravitational eld can be transformed away (Reichenbach, 1928, 271; tr. 1958, 236 ). As we have seen, in Einstein's original approach, within a small enough region of spacetime, one can introduce an articial gravitational eld by a simple change of coordinate system, in which the g µν are not constant, but become functions of the coordinates.
For the very same reason one can make this gravitational eld disappear through a coordinate transformation: we can set the metrical eld in such a manner that the components, the gravitational potentials [g µν ] become constants (this is always possible at least for local regions); then there exists no gravitational gradient. The disappearance of the gradient is then called`the disappearance of the gravitational eld.' (Reichenbach, 1928, 271; tr. 1958, 236 ; second emphasis mine).
Reichenbach suggested then to distinguish among the tensor as g µν as a whole or the metrical eld, the particular sets of tensor components, in a certain coordinate system and nally the particular set of gradient coecients of the tensor components (Reichenbach, 1928, 271; tr. 1958, 236): In the mathematical representation, the metrical eld is given by the tensor gµν the gravitational potential eld by the particular set of components gµν , and the gravitational gradient eld through the RiemannChristoel symbols Γ τ µν , which are obtained from the ∂gµν ∂xτ . The Γ τ µν , do not form a real tensor, only a linear tensor, and can therefore all at once be transformed to zero by nonlinear transformations. A fourth concept has occasionally been introduced. We set gµν + γµν , where gµν are the normal orthogonal values of the gµν , and we refer to the gµν as the inertial eld and only to the γµν as the gravitational potential eld. The Γ τ µν may then be considered as the derivatives of the γµν , since the gµν as constants do not contribute to the gradient eld. This resolution into inertial and gravitational eld is an adaptation to the terminology of Newtonian mechanics, however, and is therefore hardly appropriate. (Reichenbach, 1928, 272; tr. 1958, 237) This passage is curiously written in smaller characters; Reichenbach's intention is simply to introduce some mathematical technicalities. This is revealing of Reichenbach's philosophical attitude. From today's point of view, the passage just quoted in fact seems to describe the very conceptual core of Einstein's path to the Theory of General Relativity. The conceptual dierence between gravitational elds and the other elds is that the latter, according to Einstein, should be represented by a non-tensorial, coordinate-dependent quantity, the Christoel symbols Γ τ µν . Locally, the phenomena of gravity and acceleration were, in Einstein's view, two ways of looking at the same space-time in terms of dierent coordinate systems.
Reichenbach is so aware of the importance of this point, that he even addresses the problems which arise following Einstein's original approach: If we change to three-dimensional polar coordinates, for example, while the time coordinate remains unchanged, the g µν will assume a non-standard from. For these coordinates there must therefore exist a gravitational eld, since in polar coordinates the partial
] do not vanish throughout (Reichenbach, 1928, 290, n.; tr. 1958, 253) . This is however rather counter-intuitive since no change in the state of motion is provided by a mere spatial transformation, which leaves the g 44 unchanged (see for instance Reichenbächer, 1923) . This says more than was originally expressed by the principle of equivalence. (Reichenbach, 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253.) It would therefore be advantageous to express the gravitational eld in a coordinate invariant form (on this point see Eddington, 1923, 39f.) : all g µν -systems derived from a g στ -system by means of coordinate transformations are merely different resolutions of the same tensor into dierent sets of components. This tensor, the metrical eld, is therefore independent of specic coordinate systems (Reichenbach, 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253) . A physical magnitude expressed by a tensor has denite components once a basis is given in a chosen coordinate system, but abstractly considered, it stands for its components in all coordinate systems. All transformable systems should represent the same gravitational eld, whose presence should be better expressed by the non-vanishing of Riemann-Christoel tensor R µνστ . However, this would mean to accept the consequence that transformations of the state of motion will not change the gravitational eld either, since they too leave the metrical eld invariant (Reichenbach, 1928, 291; tr. 1958, 254) . In this way the principle of equivalence (that is the possibility of interpreting locally an acceleration eld as gravitational eld) would become useless. (Reichenbach, 1927) all of this can be understood precisely because Einstein had to introduce in physics a new mathematical method, the so-called tensor calculus. The essence of the new method of calculation resides in two basic concepts, the invariant and the covariant (Reichenbach, 1927, 105) . In particular Reichenbach suggests to interpret the gravitational eld as a covariant magnitude, which depends on the coordinate system, and the metric eld as an invariant magnitude :
This consideration leads to a distinction which we have touched upon several times before and which expresses a basic idea of modern science.
The system of the tensor components is covariant, i.e. it has a dierent numerical composition for each coordinate system. Yet we express in this fashion a state that is independent of the coordinate system, i.e., an invariant state. The tensor as a whole is an invariant magnitude. We can recognize this property from its representation by means of components, since the components can be calculated for every coordinate system, if they are known for one. It is unfortunate that the physical terminology does not reect this well-dened mathematical distinction. By gravitational eld we understand the system of components of the tensor in each case; this makes the gravitational eld a covariant magnitude.
No particular term has been accepted for the invariant tensor eld as a whole. It might best be called the metrical eld, in accordance with some ideas which we shall discuss later; in fact, this term has occasionally been used with this meaning. In this terminology the gravitational eld is the particular system of components into which the metrical eld has been resolved (Reichenbach, 1928, 271; tr. 1958, 236 ).
Reichenbach's terminology is surely non-standard. As we have seen, Reichenbach himself notices that the gravitational eld is represented by the Christoel symbols, that is, by a non-tensorial, i.e. non-covariant quantity (cf. above p. 12). However, the point Reichenbach wants to make is clear enough: The values of the components g µν depend on a particular coordinate system, they are covariant quantities.
However, regardless of the coordinate system used, the lengths of lines are assigned the same value, that is the length between a pair of spacetime points is an invariant quantity.
According to Reichenbach [t] he coordinate systems themselves are not equivalent, in the sense that in every system a dierent set of tensor components g µν is dened; however every coordinate system with its corresponding gravitational eld is equivalent to any other coordinate system together with its corresponding gravitational eld (Reichenbach, 1928, 272; tr. 1958, 237 ) . The ensemble of all inter-transformable g µν -systems represent the same metric eld and thus the same geometry of space-time: Each of these covariant descriptions is an admissible representation of the invariant state of the world (Reichenbach, 1928, 272; tr. 1958, 237 ) . Similarly an electromagnetic eld as whole transforms as a tensor, but not the electric and the magnetic eld separately: an electric eld for one observer could be a superposition of an electric and a magnetic eld for the other.
Surprisingly from Reichenbach semi-technical presentation of the General Theory of Relativity one learns that the gravitational eld is deprived of its absolute character and recognized as a covariant magnitude (Reichenbach, 1928, 248; tr. 1958, 214) , that is (in Reichenbach's parlance) a coordinate-dependent magnitude, represented by Γ τ µν . In a at Minkowski spacetime, an articial gravitational eld can be introduced by a mere coordinate transformation. On the other hand, the geometry of space-time has an absolute character in the sense that it is coordinate independent, it does not change if one represents it in dierent coordinate systems;
for instance, Minkowski space-time is at, which means that the Riemann tensor R µνστ vanishes everywhere regardless of the coordinate system used.
Following the more expository parts of Reichenbach's book one discovers that there is indeed a conventional element in the General Theory of Relativity; however this is not the geometry, but rather the gravitational eld. The same space-time geometry, which in a coordinate system only has an inertial component, whereas in another coordinate system it has both an inertial and a gravitational. Since the Christoel-symbols are not tensors, if they have zero components, that is only inertial components, in one coordinate-system, there exists a coordinate system in which the components are non-zero and a gravitational eld appears
The consequence is that the distinction between inertia and gravitation is a mathematical artifact which depends on the choice of the coordinates and therefore does not reect a real physical dierence: only the sum of the two pieces, represents something physical. Following this line of thought, which has remained somehow hidden behind the curtains of Reichenbach's ocial philosophy, one discovers, that the core of Einstein's original approach should not be found in the discovery of the relativity of geometry, but rather in the discovery of relativity of the gravitational eld (Janssen, 2005 Reichenbach's idea that the gravitational force has to be set equal to zero, is at least ambiguous (Torretti, 1983, 237) . The best way to understand the fact gravity is a universal force is precisely to recognize that the gravitational eld Γ τ µν (x ν ) is not a tensor eld on spacetime, whereas the potential eld g µν (x ν ) is. This distinction of course gets lost using the conceptual resources of the Hemholtz/Poincaré's debate on the foundation of geometry; it is only accessible to the mathematical treatment by means of Riemannian geometry (Reichenbach, 1928, 290; tr. 1958, 253) . In particular, as Reichenbach knows very well of course, Christoel and Ricci ichenbach, 1929b, 684) .
From this point view it becomes particularly clear that the displacement space, the guiding led that tells particles how to go is not arbitrary. What is arbitrary is the splitting of the displacement space into gravitational and inertial parts. The same path of particles can be interpreted as a consequence of the eect of inertia or of gravitation, depending on the coordinate system chosen. The dierence between inertial and gravitation is a mere mathematical dierence, that has no correspondence in physical realty.
However, as the last part of Reichenbach's book (which was not translated into English) was dedicated to a very careful discussion of Weyl's theory of electromagnetism, Reichenbach seems to consider this step from the metrical to the displacement eld as philosophically irrelevant. The quantities Γ τ µν cannot be measured directly by rods and clocks, but must be obtained from the directly measured quantities g µν by calculation: they are a product of fantasy, mere illustration (Reichenbach, 1928, 352 ; on this point see Coa, 1979) .
Contrary to Reichenbach's opinion, however, it cannot be denied that here one is confronted with one of the most relevant conceptual issues raised by General
Relativity. It is well-known that modern relativists usually prefer to identify the presence of a gravitational eld with the non-vanishing of the Riemann-Christoel tensor, that is with the curvature (Synge, 1970) because of its independence from the coordinate system (on this topic see Lehmkuhl, 2008 ). The equivalence principle is then reduced to a sort of midwife (Synge, 1960) at the birth of General Relativity (see also Ohanian, 1977 (This was still not so clear at the time of the setting up of the G.R., but was subsequently recognized principally through Levi-Civita). In the setting up of the theory, I chose the symmetric tensor g ik as the starting concept. It provided the possibility of dening the displacement eld Γ l ik , which determines to every vector in the inntesimal point P another vector in every innitesimally near point P (δA
This concept of the displacement eld is in-itself independent from the existence of a metric eld g ik ; that it was at rst introduced only in connection to the metric eld, is only the consequence of the fact that The vanishing of Christoel symbols does not mean that there is no displacement eld/gravitational (Giulini, 2001, 9) . A gravitational eld can always be introduced, even in a at Minkowski space-time, by a simple change in coordinates.
Thus the at metric of spacetime can be regarded as a special case of a gravitational eld, rather than the absence of a gravitational eld (see also Einstein to Becquerol, August 16, 1951 , cited by Norton, 1985 . This seems to be in harmony with Einstein's famous claim that there is no space without a eld. If we imagine the gravitational eld to be removed, there remains absolutely nothing, and also no`topological space ' (Einstein, 1952, 155) .
6. Conclusion. Over-determination versus Under-determination Reichenbach' s idea that the topology of space is to be regarded as a more fundamental determination than the metric (Reichenbach, 1929a) seems to derive from the observation, that the metric relations, the lengths of worldlines do not remain invariant under a deformation of spacetime (induced for instance by a universal force) that preserve smoothness of the coordinate system and the uniqueness of the labeling of the points, that is, that which deprives the coordinate system of all but is topological properties.
However distances do remain invariant under a transformation which represents a mere recoordinization, that is, under the condition that the coecients of the quadratic form also change. Of course this is exactly the relevant point. The geometry of a given space-time is characterized by the invariant interval between any two world points; once a unit of measure has be chosen, the numerical value of this interval remain unchanged under coordinate transformations.
What is relevant in GeneralRelativity, as Reichenbach had shown in his 1920, is precisely the relativity of coordinates and not the relativity of geometry as in Rechenbach's mature philosophy: The relativity of geometry is a consequence of the fact that dierent geometries can be represented by one another with a oneto-one correspondence (Reichenbach, 1929a) . The relativity of coordinates is that the same geometry can be represented in dierent coordinate systems.
As we have tried to show, the origin of Reichenbach's conversion can be re- The solution to the problem of space described here is to be attributed principally to the work of Riemann, Helmholtz, Poincaré, and Einstein,
Helmholtz. The rst to acknowledge the signicance of Riemann's idea for physics, indisputably deserves the major credit for the recognition of the denitional character of congruence in physical space. Poincaré coined the term conventionalism, which refers to the denitional character of the congruence of line segments and designated the denition in question as a convention. At the time he introduced this idea, Poincaré still believed that the convention of the rigid body led to Euclidean geometry, not knowing that Einstein was soon to take up the idea of conventionalism in all seriousness and apply non-Euclidean geometry to physics, nal clarication came about with the philosophical discussion of Einstein's general theory of relativity (Reichenbach, 1929a, 60; tr. Reichenbach, 1978, 179) As recent literature has abundantly shown, General Relativity cannot be the heir of this philosophical/mathematical tradition simply because such does not exist.
Poincaré excluded explicitly the Riemanniann geometries of variable curvature from his conventionalism, precisely because they were at odds with the Helmholtzian approach based on the existence of rigid bodies. As we have tried to point out,
Riemann's geometrical approach to geometry remained actually dormant and developed in a rather non-geometrical tradition, whose main protagonists can be considered to be Christoel and Ricci. The geometrical implication of the calculus that developed mainly after the emergence of General Relativity by Levi-Civita and others.
A much more plausible line of development of Riemann's work in the 19th century is for instance that which was suggested by Cartan in a non-technical paper of 1931:
Euclidean geometry itself also uses analytic methods lying on the use of coordinates, but these coordinates (Cartesian, rectangular, polar, etc.) have a precise, quantitative geometric signicance, which is why they can be introduced only after the geometry is founded by its own methods.
In Riemannian geometry, on the contrary, coordinates, introduced from the beginning, serve simply to relate empirically the dierent points of space, and geometry has precisely the object of extricating the geometric properties that are independent of this arbitrary choice of coordinates.
. . . The necessity of using systems of arbitrary coordinates exerted a profound inuence on the later development of mathematics and physics.
It led to the admirable creation of an absolute dierential calculus by Ricci and Levi-Civita, which was the instrument that helped to elaborate general relativity (Cartan, 1931 , 397f., tr. Pesic, 2007 .
We are dealing with two mathematical traditions which seem to be interested in dierent philosophical problems. Helmholtz and Poincaré tried to determine under which condition it is possible to make a choice among alternative physical geometries, which shares some weaker mathematical structure. Riemann raised rather the problem of distinguishing the intrinsic features of a given physical geometry, from the apparent dierences introduced by the choice of a particular coordinate system.
There is a broader philosophical lesson that we can draw from the historical reconstruction we have outlined. Considered under the light of he 19th century philosophy of geometry the Logical Empiricists could interpret General Relativity as a case of mathematical undertermination : the relevant geometric structure that
General Relativity has at its disposal (what the Logical Empiricist call the topological structure) is not rich enough to allow a choice among dierent possible physical geometries. Considered under the historical perspective we have suggested, the requirement of general covariance, if it is not be considered trivial, seems to raise rather a problem of overdetermination ; that is, the physical system is described by a surplus of mathematical structure (Norton, 2003 ; more in general on this topic Redhead, 2001 ).
The Logical Empiricists' strategy was to introduce some redundant physical elements (the universal forces) in order to extract the mathematically relevant content of the theory. From a contemporary prospective, by the contrary, General Relativity seems rather to introduce redundant mathematical structure in order to extract the physically relevant content of the theory, as the invariant content (Giulini, 2007 ).
Einstein's notorious hole argument , Hilbert's version of the argument in terms of Cauchy initial conditions (Stachel, 1988 (Stachel, /1992 , are precisely the consequence of the existence of mathematical degrees of freedom that do not have any correspondence in physical reality. The covariance of Einstein's equations leave undetermined the evolution of four out of the ten components of g µν . Instead of being a trivial consequence of the application of the absolute dierential calculus as in Kretschmann objection, such a redundancy in mathematical formalism appears rather to be one of the main philosophical issues raised by General Relativity (Norton, 2003) .
Historically, this problem was rediscovered in the late 1950's by Peter Bergmann (Bergmann, 1956 (Bergmann, , 1961b Bergmann and Komar, 1960; Bergmann, 1961a) , Einstein's assistant in Princeton, who was led to re-discuss the question of what is observable in General Relativity. From this vantage point, the Logical Empiricists' idea that the metric is not an observable, wheres the neighborhood relations encoded in the coordinate system are, appears then utterly inadequate to grasp the relevant philosophical issue; General Relativity shows rather, that because of the mathematical ambiguity of the coordinate system (Bergmann, 1956, 491) , the values of the metric at a particular world-point are not an observable (Bergmann, 1961b (Bergmann, , 1968 .
While Reichenbach still in his last writings insisted that the main philosophical issue of Einstein's general theory was the existence of a class of equivalent descriptions (Reichenbach, 1953, 133) of dierent physical situations ; after Reichenbach's death it began to become clear that the real problem, as Bergmann put it, is then in General Relativity, there is an equivalence class of solutions that describes same physical situation (Bergmann, 1961b) . Only the equivalence class is physically real.
